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Introduction: a Semipresidential 
Constitution?
Since 1789, the large number of constitu-
tional texts in France has re#ected ambivalence 
about the organization of the polity. On the one 
hand, by transferring the onus of sovereignty 
from a monarch to the people (sometimes theo-
rized as the nation) the governing body could 
become a representative regime with an as-
sembly as its main governing institution. $is 
“pure,” sometimes “excessive” parliamentary 
form of government was to be the basis of nu-
merous constitutional texts. On the other hand, 
French constitutional texts did not necessar-
ily excise remnants of the ancient tribal Indo-
European society established through a Fran-
co-Germanic hierarchical monarchic society. 
Indeed, ambivalence and discontent in French 
society regarding the dialectical relationship 
between these two poles of government today 
%nds expression in contrasting parliamentary 
versus presidential regimes. $e %&y-one-year-
old Constitution of the Fi&h Republic is an at-
tempt to reconcile these two regime forms.
$e structural debate of “who shall govern” 
formed part of the preparatory debate for the 
dra&ing of the 1958 Constitution of the Fi&h 
Republic, and it is present in the text itself. It is 
also present in two major constitutional modi-
%cations that took place in 1962 (direct election 
of the head of state) and 2000 (reduction of the 
head of state’s term of o'ce from seven to %ve 
years), although it is less evident in the 2008 
amendment (limit to two consecutive terms 
of o'ce).1 $is article looks at the dynamics 
within the text of the Constitution, particu-
larly the revisions that concern the role of head 
of state (the president), that give the executive 
a major in#uence on governance in France. It 
considers the current semipresidential system 
of government and the workings of the “two-
headed” executive (head of state and head of 
government). $e signi%cant modi%cations to 
the Constitution examined here have created 
space for major changes in the functioning of 
the institutions of the Fi&h Republic. In partic-
ular, the partisan synchronization of the o'ces 
of president and prime minister has become an 
important psycho-political matter rather than 
a legal-political one, and in this article I pres-
ent a taxonomy, organized around the most rel-
evant changes to the Constitution of the Fi&h 
Republic with regard to its semipresidential as-
pects (the 1962 and 2000 revisions), using the 
categories of pure synchronization, nonsyn-
chronization, and forced synchronization. I will 
also brie#y address the current situation under 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and the 2008 consti-
tutional revision.
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Varieties of Partisan 
Synchronization 
On 21 December 1958, in the %rst presi-
dential election under the new Constitution, 
Charles De Gaulle was elected by an enlarged 
electoral college, composed mainly of mem-
bers of parliament. It was quite certain that he 
would be elected president if his party led par-
liament (as it did). But when the president was 
elected by direct universal su*rage a&er the 
1962 change, the electoral college had reached a 
critical mass. Because of the bicephalous char-
acter of the executive under the Constitution of 
the Fi&h Republic, and due to the new balance 
within the constitutional arrangement, there 
was, a&er 1962, a new possibility for president 
and parliament, directly elected by the people, 
to be synchronized. $is possibility a*ected 
the very functioning of the bicephalous execu-
tive. $e prime minister, who has usually been 
a close ally of the president, needed a major-
ity in the directly elected lower chamber (As-
semblée nationale), otherwise he would be un-
able to pass policy into law. Maurice Duverger 
writes that the majority is %rst formed around 
the head of state and the president is normally 
the party leader. If the president is not, then the 
party leader should be the prime minister, al-
though in recent times the situation has been 
more complex, even confused.2 Duverger also 
predicted that a majority in the directly elected 
chamber from a di*erent party than the presi-
dent would oppose him. 
In fact, two such situations a&er 1962 have 
occurred: the period of constitutional function-
ing under a fait majoritaire (a majority in the 
two directly elected institutions) and the period 
of functioning under cohabitation (literally liv-
ing together; it is usual here to characterize a 
two-headed executive with two opponents). 
$e fait majoritaire is o&en called the période 
normale. $is implies that there is a “normal” 
reading of the French Constitution and an “ab-
normal” one, but this dichotomy is problematic. 
It is preferable, instead, to adopt the concepts of 
synchronization and nonsynchronization with-
in the executive, and therefore between the two 
institutions elected by the people: president and 
lower legislative chamber (whether or not we 
consider their status as representative or not). In 
any case, it is evident from the positions taken 
a&er the two e*orts at constitutional revision 
that “normalcy” and “abnormality” constitute 
important aspects of the justi%cation used by 
the political elites and commentators (the 2008 
amendment is an exception): pure synchroniza-
tion is normal and therefore good; cohabitation 
is not normal, so it must be bad. As a result, the 
situation had to be brought back to normalcy, 
even if by force.3 $e Fi&h Republic was suppos-
edly ill and the remedy was to enforce partisan 
synchronization between president and elected 
chamber. 
Pure synchronization
In the “normal” functioning of the insti-
tutions the fait majoritaire is created by a di-
rectly elected head of state who is the leader of 
the party or coalition leading the elected lower 
chamber. As we have seen, the presidential term 
of o'ce lasted for seven years until amended in 
2000, and the Assemblée nationale members’ 
term of o'ce lasted for %ve years. $is discrep-
ancy in term of o'ce le& the  “two-headed” ex-
ecutive in a peculiar position.  
In a situation of fait majoritaire, there is 
pure synchronization re#ecting a strong semi-
presidential system. $ere have been three pe-
riods of pure synchronization: 1958-86 (De 
Gaulle’s %rst and second terms, Georges Pom-
pidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and François 
Mitterrand’s %rst term and the period before 
the 1986 general elections), 1988-93 (Mitter-
rand’s second term, the period before the 1993 
general elections), and 1995–97 (Jacques Chi-
rac’s %rst term and the period before the 1997 
general elections). Despite appearances, the 
phenomenon of pure synchronization is varied 
as regards the power balance between president 
and prime minister. 
$e head of state in a situation of pure syn-
chronization is no longer considered a referee 
or politically neutral (un arbiter). $e president 
is involved in policy making, although he may 
use his prime minister as an intermediary be-
tween himself and the people or members of 
parliament. $is may contribute to an inverted 
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 71
reading of what is happening. $e president is 
supposed to preside while the prime minister 
executes: it is a system that should be simulta-
neously presidential and parliamentary. In fact, 
the president becomes the real and unique mo-
tor of the executive; he de%nes the program of 
his government. But articles 20 and 21 of the 
French Constitution state that the “the govern-
ment shall determine and conduct the policy 
of the nation” and “shall direct the conduct of 
government a*airs,” not the head of state. $e 
president, in receiving democratic legitimacy 
from an election that was supposed to put him 
above all partisan games, enters the political 
arena. $is has an impact not only on the func-
tion of the head of state, but also on the presi-
dent’s ability to stay in power. Indeed, if the 
president is the real actor of the executive, he 
will su*er from taking and making decisions. 
(Giscard d’Estaing was not re-elected in 1981, 
for example, while Mitterrand in 1988, and 
Chirac in 2002 were re-elected a&er a period of 
nonsynchronization).
$e strong leadership of the head of state is 
only possible because the president increases his 
legitimacy with his democratic mandate; as a 
result, constitution practice that di*ers from its 
letter goes uncontested. Strong leadership con-
tributes to a modi%cation of the classic func-
tions of government as laid out in the Constitu-
tion, and the classic parliamentary practice of 
government as the initiator and maker of laws 
is no exception.
Indeed, in every case of presidential powers 
exercised on the advice of the prime minister or 
the government, the practice of fait majoritaire 
modi%es the reality of the Constitution, invert-
ing the meaning of the articles’ wording. In re-
lation to the wording of article 8, paragraph 1, 
which obliges the prime minister to resign only 
if he decides to, we note that, in practice, it is 
always the head of state who forces the head of 
government to resign, legality being respected 
by a purely arti%cial agreement on the legal 
mechanism involved. Article 8, paragraph 1 
is worded in such a way as to suggest that the 
prime minister will issue a letter of resigna-
tion and the president will accept it. In reality, 
the president asks the prime minister to pre-
pare this letter when the prime minister is %rst 
appointed. 
Similar comments can be made on the use 
of article 11. According to the text, the govern-
ment is supposed to advise the president on the 
holding of a referendum (although not on a 
constitutional amendment, which is dealt with, 
normally, in article 89). Nevertheless, referenda 
are initiated by the head of state. $is phenom-
enon is certainly evident in the case of the “Fa-
ther” of the French Constitution. Indeed, some 
have claimed that De Gaulle’s use of article 11 
(in 1962 and 1969) was illegal.4 
Outside the scope of presidential discretion-
ary powers, the president needs the government 
and/or the prime minister to act legally. Coun-
tersigning of presidential documents in a peri-
od of fait majoritaire is automatic. It is the core 
of the bicephalous organized executive. Both 
heads sign acts of the executive. In a condition 
of synchronization, the two heads have similar 
wills and present a uni%ed opinion. Unlike the 
former republics, however, in the Fi&h Republic 
there is no ambiguity: the head of state is the 
decision maker and the prime minister follows 
suit.
$e appointment and %ring of government 
members, under article 8, paragraph 2, is pre-
sented as something the president does with 
the help of the prime minister. In fact, in the 
fait majoritaire, the head of state not the prime 
minister chooses ministers and gets rid of them. 
$e same may be said of article 13, paragraph 
1 of the Constitution, or the understanding of 
articles 15 and 21. Article 13 states that gov-
ernment regulations are deliberated upon by 
a council of ministers. $e initiative is le& to 
ministers and the discussion is collegial, with 
the president signing only government regula-
tions. In a situation of fait majoritaire, the presi-
dent interferes with this process and may refuse 
to sign. In article 15 and 21 the president is the 
head of the army, but the prime minister (and in 
some respects the minister of defence) also has 
some powers in this area. In a situation of fait 
majoritaire the latter are mere executants of the 
presidential will and lose all freedom to act on 
their own initiative. 
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Nonsynchronization based on 
political factors
Nonsynchronization occurs when the di-
rectly elected head of state and the majority 
of the directly elected lower chamber are from 
di*erent sides of the political spectrum. In cor-
ollary fashion, cohabitation is a counter to fait 
majoritaire and in that situation the system of 
government is closer to a prototype of the par-
liamentary system of government than it is to a 
presidential system.5
$ese issues may initially seem somewhat 
mechanical, or simply questions of timing. $e 
president’s term of o'ce was seven years and 
that of the Assemblée nationale, %ve years. In a 
purely parliamentary regime, there would be no 
problem when at year n + !ve of the presiden-
tial mandate, the lower chamber shi&ed to the 
opposition, leaving a head of government from 
the other political side. In the case of the Fi&h 
Republic, the bicephalous executive makes the 
partisan views of the two executive heads ex-
tremely important. In situations of nonsynchro-
nization, the prime minister is either the leader 
or a strong %gurehead for the party or coalition 
leading the directly elected chamber. $e two-
headed executive is not synchronized anymore 
and although that is no cause for alarm in a 
parliamentary system of government, it appears 
to disrupt the system of strong leadership estab-
lished by De Gaulle (hence the comment made 
earlier on the normal and abnormal function-
ing of the Constitution). $en again, even with 
a president con%ned to his constitutional pow-
ers, there is still a strong leader as the %gure-
head of the country. $is situation was manifest 
in 1967 and 1978. 
In March 1967 it was expected that general 
elections would be won by the opposition and 
that a majority hostile to De Gaulle would be 
returned, although in the end a very small ma-
jority supporting the president was elected to 
the Assemblée nationale. In 1978, the Le& was 
expected to win the general elections. If it was 
clear in 1967 that De Gaulle would not remain 
president if facing a hostile Assemblée natio-
nale, in 1978 Giscard d’Estaing was prepare to 
remain in place and therefore create an oppor-
tunity for the Fi&h Republic’s %rst instance of 
nonsynchronization. $e loss of a general elec-
tion is a clear demonstration that a party has 
lost the support of the people who have become 
disenchanted with how the country is ruled. 
De Gaulle would certainly have resigned had 
he faced an instance of nonsynchronization, 
respecting “his” populist interpretation of the 
Constitution. In light of the proximity of the 
March 1967 elections to the well-known politi-
cal phenomenon of May 1968,6 it is worth con-
sidering the potential impact of rigidity in Fran-
ces’s political institutions. $e people had not 
seen anything changing and took to the streets. 
De Gaulle’s resignation might have brought 
about a le&-wing presidency, which would have 
accepted the need to govern alongside an op-
position party-led Assemblée nationale. But this 
is only supposition. What is important to note 
in this “missed” cohabitation is the necessity 
of equilibrium within the basic institutions of 
government. If there is none, political opposi-
tion is le& to people taking to the streets rather 
than working within the mechanisms for insti-
tutional mediation. 
$e second possibility o*ered by nonsyn-
chronization is an executive with two opposing 
leaders. It occurred in neither 1967 nor 1978, 
although the president was ready for the possi-
bility of nonsynchroniszation. $e %rst instance 
of this phenomenon was in 1986, and two varia-
tions have taken place in more recent history.
A le!-wing president brie"y faces a right-
wing prime minister
President François Mitterrand lost gener-
al elections twice, each time within two years 
of the end of his term of o'ce. On 16 March 
1986,7 Mitterrand lost the support of the low-
er chamber; the general election was won by a 
right-wing coalition made up of the Rassemble-
ment pour la République and Union pour la 
démocratie française (RPR-UDF) lead by Chi-
rac. Mitterrand did not resign but appointed 
Chirac as head of government, who remained 
in place until the presidential election of 1988. 
$e general elections of 21 and 28 March 1993 
again returned a right-wing majority. $e Parti 
socialiste (PS) won only %&y-six seats (17.5 per-
cent of the vote). During this period, 1993-95, 
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Mitterrand appointed Edouard Balladur, Chi-
rac preferring a “semi retreat” to prepare for the 
presidential election of 1995.
A right-wing president facing a le!-wing prime 
minister 
In 1997, Chirac decided to dissolve a strong-
ly supportive lower chamber and provoke gen-
eral elections. He subsequently lost his majority. 
$is triggered the beginning of a long period of 
nonsynchronization, 1997–2002. Lionel Jospin 
became prime minister and he remained in this 
position until the 2002 presidential election.8
Political disagreement within the executive 
may have an impact on constitutional practice 
in many ways. $e functioning of the Consti-
tution described in situations of synchroniza-
tion is mirrored in nonsynchronization with 
the president losing many of his powers (strong 
presidential leadership remains on matters of 
external sovereignty, with diplomatic matters 
and defence being part of the “presidential do-
main”). $e president may decide to block the 
work of the government by using constitution-
ally sanctioned discretionary powers to sign 
delegated legislation (ordonnances). Under ar-
ticle13, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, Mit-
terrand refused to sign three ordonnances.9 $is 
nonsynchronization creates an interesting situ-
ation, which does not comply strictly with the 
constitutional gaullienne vision of the Fi&h Re-
public. While many were considering the risk 
of a major institutional crisis under nonsyn-
chronized institutions of government, the fact 
is that such occurrences prove the Constitution 
to be simultaneously rigid and yet #exible in its 
application. $e Constitution remained rigid, 
allowing alternance in 1981, and allowing dis-
sonant executives in 1986, 1993, and 1997. How-
ever, the Constitution also proved #exible in its 
resistance to a reading not intended in 1958. 
Cohabitation produced a condition of equi-
librium around the most important keystone 
of the institutional arrangement of the Fi&h 
Republic, which was a move from a noninsti-
tutionally based equilibrium during periods of 
synchronization (where the people/nation pro-
vides the counterweight to political institutions 
belonging to the same party or political coali-
tion), to an institutional equilibrium (nonsyn-
chronization), where the counterweight forms 
around the executive itself. $is “return” to a 
parliamentary system of government provides 
more opportunities for input by the people. As 
such, the electorate may s tangibly see the result 
of its e*orts at the end of election day. Nonsyn-
chronization may therefore characterize an in-
stance of power used against power.10 
Nonsynchronization may, at times, be con-
ceptualized in more personal terms as a prob-
lem of personality con#icts between head of 
state and head of government, although the 
term cohabitation is best constrained to refer 
to problems arising from the lack of partisan 
uniformity in presidency and lower chamber. 
In any case, what  French commentators have 
shared in analyzing situations of nonsynchro-
nization is its presentation as an abnormal situ-
ation, which needs to be considered and dealt 
with. Constitutional changes proposed in 2000 
presented a solution.
Commentators have been able to defend a 
“normal” reading of the Constitution with ref-
erence to the “normal” political conditions of 
synchronized political institutions. However, 
the normal reading of the Constitution is De 
Gaulle’s interpretation, while the conventional-
ly abnormal reading, associated with situations 
of nonsynchronized political institutions is ac-
tually a reading of the Constitution as organiz-
ing a parliamentary system of government, and 
it is an interpretation consistent with a plain 
reading of the Constitutional text. $e e*ort to 
force synchronization through constitutional 
amendment is the way in which the Constitu-
tion was been rendered once again “normal.”
Forced Synchronization Based on 
Constitutional Amendment
$e modi%cation of the Constitution in 
2000 was marked by the wish to tackle the pos-
sibility of nonsynchronization. $is change fo-
cused on the mandate of the president, reducing 
it to %ve years, aligning it with the tenure of the 
deputies. In that respect, it was necessary, a&er 
the 2000 amendment, to di*er the end of the 
term of o'ce of the deputies. Parliament may 
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legislate to complete the Constitution through 
loi organique, special statute law that details 
some articles of the Constitution. In 2001, it was 
decided to extend the term of o'ce of the depu-
ties by eleven weeks to allow legislative elections 
to take place a&er the presidential election.11 Ar-
ticle L.O. 121 of the Code électoral was modi%ed 
as a consequence. $e general elections were 
planned for a few weeks before the presidential 
election on 24 March 2002, and the presidential 
election was to be held either on 14 or 21 April 
2002. $e spirit or logic of the institutional ar-
rangement was to be examined.12 In the light of 
the 2000 constitutional evolution, it was con-
sidered illogical to set the elections for directly 
elected members of parliament to take place be-
fore the presidential election. $e Conseil con-
stitutionnel, which automatically controls all loi 
organique,13 referred in its decision to the special 
position of the presidential election: “because 
of the place of the election of the president of 
the Republic by direct universal su*rage in the 
functioning of the Fi&h Republic”;14 the coun-
sellors went on to explain that it was logical for 
the general election to follow the presidential 
one. $ey made clear that “it was desirable that 
the presidential election precedes, as a general 
rule, the legislative elections and that this rule 
should be applied to the presidential election 
foreseen in 2002.”15 Everything was organized 
to synchronize this chronology: %rst electing 
the president, then electing the Assemblée na-
tionale. $at said, some possibilities remained 
for nonsynchronization, like the dissolution of 
the Assemblée nationale, or the resignation or 
even death of the president, for example.16 Only 
the president can activate the end of the syn-
chronization, and even if this happens, it will be 
limited to a short cohabitation. Since 2002, this 
has lead to a forced synchronization. 
$is is a new situation and there are only 
two examples to explore. In 2002, Chirac was 
elected with a large majority because he was fac-
ing the extreme right candidate Jean-Marie Le 
Pen. A “republican front” was built around Chi-
rac that would also lead to success in the general 
elections. An ally of the new president, Jean-
Pierre Ra*arin, became prime minister. He was 
de%nitely the secretary of the president. $e bi-
cephalous executive was back to “normal.” Even 
when Dominique de Villepin was appointed 
a&er the defeat of the referendum on the Euro-
pean Constitutional Treaty, the functioning of 
the institutions was a strongly semipresidential 
one. $e only opposition the president had to 
face came from among his supporters. Nicolas 
Sarkozy abducted the presidential party, and 
became its leader while a member of the govern-
ment (although not its chief). A second reading 
of pure synchronization is the 2007 election. Al-
though he has been president for only two years, 
it is, of course, too early to judge the actions of 
Sarkozy, although journalists have dubbed him 
a “hyperpresident” or “omnipresident.”17 Sar-
kozy, who is a young president, provides a stark 
contrast to Chirac in many ways, partly because 
he follows Chirac’s presidency. Indeed, Sarkozy 
has probably earned the tag given him. Alain 
Badiou, a French philosopher, has sarcastically 
compared Chirac to the Brejnev years in a recent 
article published in Le Monde, comparing Chi-
rac to Leonid Brejnev. Chirac was portrayed as 
the caretaker of the system rather than as some-
one who took action. $is particular method 
of ruling made him look like a president of the 
$ird or the Fourth Republic, closer to the pure 
French model of a parliamentary regime, but at 
the same time it made him appear very distant, 
more like a monarch. 
In fact, this may have been a way of dealing 
with the forced synchronization that resulted 
from the 2000 constitutional amendment. Sar-
kozy declared recently that “Je l’avais rêvé, je le 
mets en oeuvre”18 (I dreamt it, I will do it), and 
the message is, indeed, that he will do it. Sarkozy 
indicated that he would take decisions, hence 
the journalists’ accusation of hyperpresident, 
omnipresident or even “telepresident.” Never-
theless, this very gaullienne reading of the presi-
dency is re#ected in Sarkozy’s proactive bent; he 
has not taken the dull path of counterbalancing 
the pure synchronization that once again marks 
the French regime. $e presidential election 
was followed by legislative elections, and no one 
would have predicted the sudden reversal of 
the majority over this time. President Sarkozy 
led his Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(UMP) party to a massive victory in the lower 
chamber of the French parliament. $e major-
ity returned in both directly elected institutions 
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is naturally similar. But this is, in a way, done 
arti%cially. $e constitutional text does not or-
ganize any balance between the institutions; it 
only organizes them. $e new reading of the 
Constitution by the French president so far in-
cludes the following changes:
)a  All appointed ministers must face pub-
lic vote. As the timing of presidential 
and general elections is locked-in, the  
president appointed his government 
a&er his election. New ministers are 
forced by the president to campaign to 
get a seat in the lower chamber of par-
liament. One minister, a former prime 
minister under Chirac and Mayor of 
Bordeaux, Alain Juppe, lost in his at-
tempt to be elected deputy. He subse-
quently le& his position as minister,19 
clarifying the new rule by immediately 
tendering his resignation to the presi-
dent and the prime minister.
)b  Government is being opened-up. $e 
president asked eminent %gures from 
the opposition to join his team at dif-
ferent levels. First, he appointed some 
as members of government with the 
best examples being the appointment 
of Bernard Kouchner as Minister of 
French Foreign and European A*airs, 
assisted by Jospin’s ex-cabinet director, 
Jean-Pierre Jouyet; and the former na-
tional secretary of the Parti socialiste, 
Eric Besson, as Secrétaire d’Etat à la 
Prospective et l’Evaluation des politiques 
publiques, and the president of Emmaüs 
France, Martin Hirsch, as Haut com-
missaire aux solidarités actives contre la 
pauvreté. 
)c  Institutions are being reformed. A new 
committee tasked with proposing re-
forms, the Comité de ré"exion et de 
proposition sur la modernisation et le 
rééquilibrage des institutions de la Vème 
République, was o'cially set up by the 
president on 18 July 2007. $e commit-
tee delivered its report on 30 October 
2007, making seventy-seven proposals. 
President Sarkozy conducted a consti-
tutional reform process that was ap-
proved by the parliament meeting in 
Congrès on 21 July 2008.20 
$e exercise in forced synchronization, so far, 
has been a process directed by the president. 
Since 2002, forced synchronization has proceed 
either by 1) positioning the president closer to 
the neutral personage of the $ird and Fourth 
Republics (as in the case of Chirac); or 2) posi-
tioning the president as an proactive force in the 
creation of institutionalized opposition.
In conclusion, this situation cannot be le& 
to the letter of the text of the Constitution. In 
its current version, a&er an amendment dra&ed 
during the period of nonsynchronization to 
produce a plus jamais ça, a balanced way of op-
erating, changes to the Constitution have forced 
a democratization that might destroy democra-
cy itself. 
Conclusion: a Postmodern (or 
Second Modern) System?
$is article has analyzed the true nature of 
the Fi&h French Republic through an examina-
tion of the revision, evolution, and dynamics of 
the Constitution. To conclude, the functioning 
of the Constitution of the French Fi&h Republic 
does not match the intention of its creators. On 
the one hand, 1958 was to be the start of a sys-
tem with a president-monarch acting as a neu-
tral referee (un arbiter), legitimized by strong 
constitutional personal powers, together with 
a parliamentary regime aided by a rationalized 
parliament and a strong prime minister. Oscil-
lating between synchronized and nonsynchro-
nized partisan situations, the original logic gave 
way to a head of state becoming a leader, then 
moving again to a more “normal” parliamen-
tarian regime (although the president would 
conserve certain strong powers relating to ex-
ternal a*airs, and strongly resist the will of the 
prime minister on every occasion).
$ere is no doubt that the French head of 
state is one of the most powerful positions as-
signed by any constitution. However, it remains 
the strong leadership of a state in transition. 
$ree factors may help to illustrate this. 
First, the emergence of a transnational so-
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ciety in Europe is radically changing the struc-
ture of the relationship between the people/na-
tion and its governing body. Second, the French 
Republic has been facing globalization with a 
lot of economic problems undermining the way 
the system has recently developed. $ird, the 
decline of the nation-state concept, and of rep-
resentative institutions, particularly the elected 
chamber as an institution that clearly represents 
the people.
$ere is also in France, %nally, the deeply 
rooted reference to the leader of “the group,” 
the “father of the horde.” Since the decapita-
tion of Louis XVI, there has been a succession 
of political systems of government oscillating 
between strong and weak leaders. Particularly 
since 1870, the strength of the leader has been 
dramatically decreased by successive constitu-
tions. De Gaulle believed that the strong leader 
should be restored to the French Constitution. 
As France democratizes, however, the head of 
state has been symbolically “killed” with regu-
lar election. In that respect the 1962, 2000, and, 
in a way, the 2008 amendments of the Consti-
tution have given the people even more oppor-
tunities to weaken the head of state. $e 2008 
change goes even further in that respect, oblig-
ing the “father” to step down a&er ten years. 
If this does not happen, the group may not be 
happy and may show its discontent by taking to 
the streets. De Gaulle when re-elected in 1965 
replaced himself; “the group” protested in 1968. 
Chirac, re-elected in 2002, again replaced him-
self; “the group” again protested in 2005.
$e di'culty in relation to the Constitu-
tion of the Fi&h Republic is that it is a text of 
consensus, a settlement in which the position of 
the leader is similar to that of a clan that recalls 
the memory of a strong %gurehead, power, and 
God, while the parliament remains the rational 
institutionalized democratic side of the Repub-
lic. It is a di'cult game. 
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